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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this policy report is to elucidate the current Arctic strategies and 
capabilities of the major Arctic nations – Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the 
United States – with the aim of identifying American shortcomings in the region and 
potential policy suggestions to correct these failings. The report first illuminates the 
potential for resource gain in the Arctic, specifically with respect to oil and natural gas 
and the potential for commercial growth represented by new Arctic shipping routes. The 
report also discusses the difficulties associated with reaping the rewards of the Arctic, 
specifically the lack of maritime infrastructure, the additional costs and risks associated 
with operating in the Arctic, and the speed with which the Arctic is melting. 
In general, the report finds that Arctic nations other than the United States are 
moving aggressively to protect their current and future commercial gains in the Arctic 
operating space. All countries are doing so by adhering to international legal standards 
such as the UN Convention on the Laws of the Seas and creating Arctic-specific domestic 
policies. The much vaunted military expansion in the Arctic is nothing more than 
countries attempting to protect and police their economic gains in the region. The United 
States has fallen far behind in all of these regards, and stands to lose out in the Arctic if it 
does not correct this situation immediately.  
The report presents the following suggestions for the United States: 
1. Create an “American Arctic Policy” document at the Executive level  
2. Accede to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
3. Approve or facilitate funding for a new heavy icebreaker, while solving the question 
of the Polar Sea 
4. Adjudicate an appropriate compromise on the Beaufort Wedge dispute with Canada  
5. Improve bilateral capabilities and create agreements with Russia in the Bering Strait 
and Canada in the Beaufort Sea 
6. Strengthen international Arctic cooperation through strong Arctic Council leadership  
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CHAPTER ONE: WHAT LIES BENEATH… 
Introduction 
On July 8, 1879, the USS Jeannette departed from San Francisco in a bid to make 
the United States the first nation to reach the North Pole. After successfully transiting the 
Bering Strait and claiming three newly discovered islands for the United States in the 
Chukchi Sea, the Jeannette became trapped in ice. Despite the fact that it was June, the 
Arctic ice was thick enough for the entirety of the ship’s crew to disembark, unload their 
cargo, supplies, and even scientific equipment, and begin trekking across the frozen 
Arctic “Ocean”, eventually reaching mainland Russia a few months later.  
The entire tale of the Jeannette is remarkable – from its crew’s months-long 
march across the frozen Arctic to the number of new land features it discovered in an area 
previously marked as an empty space on maps. However, most extraordinary about the 
voyage of the Jeanette is the fact that the same solid ice across which the Jeannette’s 
crew trekked is now part of a major Arctic shipping route that is most decidedly not 
walkable. 
 The majority of the Arctic is facing a similar transition, from a previously frozen 
wasteland to an open ocean with massive potential for shipping and resource extraction 
beneath the surface. As this occurs, different Arctic nations are taking different paths at 
different speeds to unlock the potential of a newly liquid Arctic, pursuing military, 
economic, and diplomatic methods to secure their Arctic gains. As the melting of the 
Arctic continues, Arctic nations will continue to fight to ensure that they reap the returns 
of an ice-free Arctic.  
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Total Ice Cover 
Increase resource extraction and Arctic shipping is made possible by the decrease 
in the extent of the Arctic ice. Since 1979, the Arctic ice extent1 has receded by 13.3% 
per decade, with the ten lowest ice extents on record occurring in the past ten years.2 
Notably, however, Arctic ice cover is not a singular and constant landmass. Though there 
is a constant ice pack at the geographic North Pole, regions at lower latitudes are less 
predictable. Ice cover in these regions is more dependent on the Earth’s seasons, with 
open water and thinner ice emerging in the spring and summer months. Recently, 
however, the Arctic melt has increased, with record low levels of Arctic ice in the spring 
and summer.  
The opening of the Arctic ice is not uniform in the Arctic Circle. The Northwest 
Passage, as mentioned above, for instance, is opening much more slowly than the Bering 
Strait, with the latter expecting 450 vessel transits in 2020, as opposed to 200 through the 
NWP. Similarly, while the Arctic ice is indeed disappearing, it is doing so over an 
extended time frame. Scientists have not yet reached a consensus on when the Arctic ice 
will disappear – though most agree that the Arctic will begin experiencing summers free 
of ice by 2040.3 As a whole, the Arctic will likely be free of ice entirely by the end of the 
21st century.4  
 
1 Arctic ice extent is the measurement of the entirety of the Arctic ice mass, including any empty spaces 
within it. 
2 "2014 Melt Season in Review." Arctic Sea Ice News and Analysis. National Snow and Ice Data Center, 07 
Oct. 2014. Web. 29 Oct. 2014. 
3 Holland, Marika M., Cecilia M. Bitz, and Bruno Tremblay. "Future Abrupt Reductions in the Summer 
Arctic Sea Ice." Geophysical Research Letters 33.23 (2006). Web. 
4 Boé, Julien, Alex Hall, and Xin Qu. "September Sea-ice Cover in the Arctic Ocean Projected to Vanish by 
2100." Nature Geoscience 2.5 (2009): 341-43. Web. 
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Natural Resources 
The Arctic contains vast amounts of potential oil and gas resources. 
Approximately 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of the world’s 
undiscovered natural gas lie beneath the Arctic surface.5 For Arctic nations, these 
reserves present a huge strategic opportunity. Arctic nations that already have massive oil 
and gas sectors, such as Russia, Norway, and Canada, have the opportunity to expand 
their supplies of oil and gas for domestic consumption or foreign export. For the United 
States and Denmark, there is an opportunity to reduce dependence on foreign oil and 
bolster domestic resource production. 
However, Arctic offshore drilling is far more technically challenging than drilling 
in the rest of the world’s oceans. Arctic drilling rigs must contend with adverse weather 
conditions, freezing temperatures, and shifting and unpredictable pack ice that increase 
costs and make production more difficult. Government permits do not allow oil 
companies to drill in ice, meaning that all drilling must be conducted in open water areas 
with floating iceberg. As a result, companies have had to develop either ice-resistant 
drilling rigs that can withstand the impact of an iceberg, or drilling rigs that can float and 
move away from the well to avoid an impact.6 There have already been a number of 
incidents in Arctic drilling caused by unfamiliarity with the operating environment. In 
2012, Shell Oil’s Arctic drilling rig Kulluk broke apart from its towing unit, grounding 
itself in the Gulf of Alaska after the crew of the towing unwittingly used equipment 
5 United States of America. United States Geological Survey. Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal 
Assessment Team. Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the 
Arctic Circle. 2008. Print. 
6 Pickard, Ann. "Arctic: Questions Answered." Interview. Shell Sustainability Report 2014 2014: 32-33. 
Print. 
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unsuitable for the Arctic operating environment. More famously, the Exxon Valdez ran 
aground in the Prince William Sound in 1989, spilling hundreds of thousands of barrels 
of oil and causing an ecological disaster and marine habitat collapse, illustrating the 
increased dangers of Arctic oil spills. 
Further, in many nations, Arctic offshore drilling is limited to a select few 
companies that must go through a rigorous application process and follow strict safety 
regulations in order to drill in the Arctic. On an environmental level, an oil spill in the 
Arctic comes with additional burdens and challenges. The same adverse weather 
conditions that make drilling in the Arctic difficult make response and cleanup of an oil 
spill incredibly problematic, potentially even impossible. A more obvious concern comes 
from an oil spill akin to the Deepwater Horizon disaster of 2010. If a spill were to occur 
underwater, oil would accumulate under the Arctic ice, again making cleanup close to 
impossible. On a brighter note, the potential catastrophe of an Arctic oil spill has led to an 
international agreement. In 2013, members of the Arctic Council signed The Agreement 
on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, which 
delineates specific responsibilities amongst the different Arctic nations in the event of an 
oil spill.7  
The regulations and hazards involved with Arctic drilling makes it a difficult 
enterprise. While many energy interests have spent time exploring, drilling, and 
attempting to pursue production in the Arctic, they have demurred recently due to a high 
cost of production and lower oil prices. After the 2014 fall in the price of oil, a majority 
7 "Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic". May 15, 
2013. Kiruna, Sweden. 
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of Arctic energy interests, ranging from Chevron and Shell in the Canadian Arctic to 
Norwegian company Statoil, have ceased Arctic operations until oil prices rebound.8 
Russia’s Prirazlomnoye oil field, for instance, is unprofitable with oil at $60 per barrel, 
and would only be profitable with oil prices at or above $100 per barrel.9 
Regardless of the regulations and investment involved with Arctic drilling, energy 
interests and Arctic nations continue to authorize drilling permits and seek new Arctic 
offshore oil reserves, especially as present reserves diminish. Drilling in Alaska’s North 
Slope, for instance, used to account for one-fifth of US oil production, though that 
amount has fallen by two-thirds since peaking in 1988 due to declining reserves.10 Given 
that companies such as Shell already have invested up to $4 billion in Arctic 
infrastructure that would be expensive or logistically difficult to move elsewhere, these 
energy interests are seeking to tap new Arctic oil reserves in search of new profits.11 For 
sovereign nations, Arctic drilling holds vast economic promise. In the United States, for 
instance, 50% of Alaskan jobs, and 98% of the Alaskan economy is dependent on the 
aforementioned North Slope.12 As such, the United States has a massive interest in 
shifting the bulk of current Alaskan oil production to Arctic offshore reserves. 
 
 
8 Schultz, Colin. "Oil Companies Are Pausing Plans to Drill the Arctic." Smithsonian.com. The 
Smithsonian Institution, 19 Dec. 2014. Web. 
9 Petterson, Trude. "Ecologists: Prirazlomnaya Unprofitability Approaches $600 Million." Barents 
Observer. Norwegian Barents Secretariat, 25 Mar. 2015. Web. 
10 Schmidt, Charles W. "Offshore Exploration in the Arctic: Can Shell’s Oil-Spill Response Plans Keep 
Up?" Environmental Health Perspectives 120.5 (2012): 194-99. Web. 
11 "Resources: Hidden Treasure." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper Limited, 16 June 2012. Web. 
12 Ebinger, Charles, John P. Banks, and Alisa Schackmann. Offshore Oil and Gas Governance in the Arctic. 
The Energy Security Initiative. The Brookings Institution, Mar. 2014. Web. 
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Arctic Shipping 
Arctic shipping takes place primarily along the northern borders of Russia and 
Canada. These routes are referred to as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest 
Passage (NWP) respectively. A third route, known as the Arctic Bridge Route (ABR), 
stretches from the Hudson Bay in Canada to the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea. The 
fourth route, the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) crosses the Arctic more centrally, passing 
through the North Pole. Shipping along these routes is extremely limited, and is likely to 
continue to be so for the near future. Within the four potential Arctic sea routes, for 
instance, only the Bering Strait, which serves as the gateway to both the Northwest 
Passage and the Northern Sea Route, was navigable for a large portion of the year in 
2012, with the Transpolar and Northwest Passage blocked by large amounts of pack and 
shoulder ice year-round.13 In general, the first three are only passable by commercial 
vessels on occasion, while the Transpolar Route is only navigable by heavy icebreakers.14  
Presently, shipping along these four routes is incredibly difficult. The Arctic 
operating environment is extremely harsh, even ice-strengthened ships – those that can 
navigate mild sea ice – are vulnerable to the Arctic operating environment, as was proven 
by the sinking of the MS Explorer in 2007. One third of all Arctic-shipping casualties 
were caused by equipment damage, a much higher average than elsewhere in the world.15 
Indeed, the little shipping that does occur on these routes presently is either so rare that it 
13 United States. Department of the Navy. Navy Task Force Climate Change. U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 
2014-2030. Print. (11) 
14 McGwin, Kevin. "Shipping." The Arctic Journal. Mediehuset Sermitsiaq A.G., 16 Sept. 2014. Web. 
15 Dobie, Greg, ed. Safety and Shipping Review 2014. Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty SE, Mar. 2014. 
Web. 
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is newsworthy, or requires heavy assistance from icebreakers.16 At present shipping and 
maritime insurance companies are quite bearish on the prospect of Arctic shipping as a 
viable possibility in the near future.17 While many expeditions do receive one-off 
insurance policies, companies have yet to begin offering dedicated coverage for Arctic 
shipping. 
The future of Arctic shipping is much harder to predict. Though global warming 
and other climate factors are indeed increasing the rate at which Arctic ice is melting, 
change may not come quickly. A study conducted by the U.S. Committee on the Marine 
Transportation System concluded that ship transits through the American Arctic would 
only increase by 2-8% by 2025, including an increase in traffic from ships diverting from 
traditional sea routes.18 The study can be extrapolated to project a similarly minimal 
increase for the rest of the Arctic’s shipping routes, especially considering that the 
American Arctic is largely comprised of the Arctic’s lower latitudes. These studies, 
however, are largely based on current estimates of ship-going capabilities. Currently, 
few, if any, major cargo and shipping vessels have ice-breaking capabilities. Given that 
container ships can save as much as 40% of their travel time by using Arctic shipping 
routes rather than the Panama or Suez canals, shipping companies are likely to continue 
to consider potential cost savings derived from building an Arctic-capable vessel.19 
16 ibid 
17 Arctic Shipping: Navigating the Risks and Opportunities. Marsh Risk Management Research, Aug. 2014. 
Web. 
18 United States of America. United States Department of Transportation. Committee on the Marine 
Transportation System. A 10-Year Projection of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region. Print. (36) 
19 "Shipping." The Arctic Journal. 
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Of course, the inaccessibility of the Arctic is mitigated by the existence of 
icebreakers. Container ships and cargo vessels can transit the Arctic if escorted by a 
medium or heavy icebreaker. Currently, Russia dominates this capability, operating the 
vast majority of the world’s icebreakers through its state-owned company Atomflot.20 By 
contrast, the United States owns only four icebreakers, one of which is laid up and 
another of which is dedicated to Antarctic research.21 Increased icebreaking capabilities 
do not seem to be a priority for the United States. The National Strategy for the Arctic 
makes scant mention of America’s current ice-breaking capabilities, and there are 
currently no plans to build any additional ice-breaking vessels. 
Infrastructural Considerations 
The Arctic also continues to be a “last frontier” regarding maritime infrastructure. 
Much of the Arctic, especially regions that were mainly covered in ice until recently, 
remains completely unmapped and uncharted. To combat this, the International 
Hydrographic Organization (IHO) – the intergovernmental association responsible for 
charting the world’s navigable waters – established the Arctic Regional Hydrographic 
Commission (ARHC) in 2010 to improve Arctic bathymetry. Their work focuses on 
charting the Arctic region surrounding Canada, Greenland, Norway, and the United 
States, which has approximately 5 million square kilometers of unassessed hydrography – 
a region roughly half the size of Canada.22 Notably, less than 1% of navigationally 
20 Brigham, Lawson W., and Ben Ellis. "Arctic Marine Infrastructure." Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
2009 Report. Akureyri, Iceland: Arctic Council, PAME, Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, 
2009. Print. 
21 ibid 
22 Hains, Denis. "Status of Arctic Hydrography and Nautical Charting." Proc. of PAME II-2014, Canada, 
Whitehorse Yukon Territory. Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission, 16 Sept. 2014. Web. 
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significant waters have been mapped with modern technology in the American Arctic.23 
For some parts of the Alaskan coast, the most recent bathymetry comes from Captain 
James Cook’s 1778 mapping expedition.24  
However, the AHRC’s scope of work does not include Russian Arctic territory. 
The Russian Federal State Unitary Hydrographic Enterprise (SHD) has been conducting 
surveys since 1933 and consequently has detailed underwater topography for 90% of its 
coastal navigation routes, including most of the Northern Sea Route. Though some charts 
are outdated, given the decades that have passed since the initial survey, SHD has also 
converted the majority of its navigation charts to digital formats usable on Electronic 
Navigational Charts.25. In this sense, Russia is well ahead of American Arctic 
capabilities. 
Despite Russia’s success at mapping much of its Arctic sphere of influence, it and 
the rest of the world are limited by technological considerations within the Arctic. 
Maritime communications generally rely on geostationary satellites that orbit above the 
Equator, facilitating communications from most vessels at sea. However, the spherical 
shape of the Earth prevents these satellites from reaching the area surrounding the North 
and South Poles. Theoretically, satellite range should extend until 81.3° N, though 
empirically, satellite communications have had difficulties starting at the 70th parallel.26 
23 United States. Government Accountability Office. Maritime Infrastructure, Key Issues Related to 
Commercial Activity in the U.S. Arctic over the next Decade: Report to Congressional Requesters. 2014. 
Print. 
24 Brown, April. "Unmapped Routes May Pose Dangers for Shipping Boom in Arctic Waters." Newshour. 
PBS, 17 Sept. 2013. Web. 29 Oct. 2014. 
25 Brigham, Lawson W., and Ben Ellis. "Arctic Marine Infrastructure."  
26 Kvamstad-Lervold, Beate. "What Is the Problem with Communication in the Arctic?" Norwegian Marine 
Technology Research Institute. SINTEF. Web. 29 Oct. 2014. 
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At present, the only commercial maritime communications system that can 
operate in the Arctic is the Iridium OpenPort satellite constellation, marketed primarily at 
non-governmental and scientific research consumers, though it also has been awarded 
multi-million dollar contracts to handle aspects of US military communications.27 While 
the Iridium system can facilitate the Ship Safety and Alerting System mandated by the 
IMO, it has a very low rate of data transfer, and frequently goes offline. Additionally, the 
system is not robust enough to handle sustained, commercial transfer of ice charts and 
satellite imagery to vessels operating in the Arctic.28 By 2016, Iridium hopes to offer the 
Iridium Next system, which would offer much higher data transfer speeds that would be 
able to support increased Arctic operations.29 American tactical and strategic 
communications are provided by Northrop Grumman’s “Enhanced Polar System”, which 
allows military units above 65 degrees north to communicate with more southern 
Combatant Commander Command and Control centers.30 
  
27 Iridium Communications Incorporated. Iridium Awarded Contract From Defense Information Systems 
Agency Worth Up to $47 Million. 31 Oct. 2012. Web. 
28 Brigham, Lawson W., and Ben Ellis. "Arctic Marine Infrastructure."  
29 Bowes, Michael D. "Impact of Climate Change on Naval Operations in the Arctic." Center for Naval 
Analyses, Apr. 2009. Web. 
30 United States of America. United States Air Force. Los Angeles Air Force Base. Enhanced Polar System. 
2014. Print. 
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CHAPTER TWO: FOREIGN INFLUENCES  
The UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
The 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
delineates international maritime boundaries. Though the United Nations has no 
regulatory or operational ability to enforce the treaty itself, it is functionally international 
law. Waters within a country’s shoreline – lakes, rivers, and other bodies of water 
completely surrounded by the country – are considered “internal waters” and completely 
under the jurisdiction of the nation. Any coastal state has complete jurisdiction over 
“territorial waters”, those that up to 12 nautical miles from its ocean shore, though vessels 
have the right of innocent passage31 through these waters. Coastal nations may suspend 
the right of innocent passage through their waters for purposes of national security, 
except in strategic straits. In these straits, all vessels have the right to transit passage, 
wherein their continuous transit through a particular strait is necessary for naval 
operations. 
Coastal states also have rights to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that extends 
200 nautical miles from its shoreline and provides rights to all natural resources 
contained therein. Resource rights additionally extend along a country’s continental 
shelf32 until 350 nautical miles from the shoreline. However, for countries to receive 
these continental shelf rights, they must submit a claim to the UN Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) within 10 years of ratifying UNCLOS. While the 
31 Innocent passage is granted to vessels transiting territorial waters in a non-commercial and non-military 
manner. 
32 A continental shelf is the “natural prolongation”, or extension of a country’s land into the sea 
14 
                                                                                                 
Commission has adjudicated some claims that have been submitted – Russia’s claim to a 
large area in the Sea of Okhotsk, for instance, was settled in its favor – it has not yet ruled 
in favor or against any the five current Arctic submissions. The complex nature of the 
claims – any one could have implications for others – means that the Commission could 
take decades to decide the status of the Arctic.33 At present, the only Arctic nations that 
have submitted claims are Russia, Norway, Canada, and Denmark. Russia’s claim, which 
was filed in 2001, was neither accepted nor rejected by the Commission, which requested 
further data and evidence before adjudicating the claim. Russia intends to submit this 
evidence in late 2015.34 Though Canada has yet to formally submit its claim in the 
Arctic, it eventually will claim parts of the Arctic also claimed by Russia and Denmark.  
The Arctic Council 
The highest level of international cooperation in the Arctic region is organized by 
the Arctic Council. The Council is neither a legislative nor administrative body. Rather, it 
functions more as a semi-regular discussion forum on Arctic policy issues. Membership 
in the Council is limited to nations with Arctic territory, though a number of indigenous 
peoples’ organizations are permanent participants in the council; they may consult with 
and work on Council issues, but lack voting rights.35 An eclectic swath of other states and 
intergovernmental organizations has been granted observer status for Arctic Council 
proceedings, ranging from Singapore to Spain. The Arctic Council meets biannually to 
discuss issues ranging from environmental protection to search and rescue agreements. 
33 Gronewold, Nathanial. "A Peek inside the U.N.'s Continental Shelf Commission." The New York Times. 
The New York Times Company, 14 Sept. 2009. Web. 
34 Gorenburg, Dmitry. "Russian Interests and Policies in the Arctic." War on the Rocks. 7 Aug. 2014. Web. 
35 "About the Arctic Council." The Arctic Council. 07 Apr. 2011. Web. 
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The structure of the Council is oriented largely towards “The Arctic Five”, the 
five nations with a coastal claim to the Arctic Ocean. These nations are Russia, Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, and the United States. This arrangement is controversial amongst the 
other members of the Arctic Council; frequently the Five break off into separate meetings 
to discuss Arctic policy.36 However, given that the majority of the Arctic Council’s work 
is of a largely non-military nature, many of the member nations tend to ignore or 
downplay the Council’s significance. As an example of this apathy, the Council operated 
for fifteen years before the United States sent a cabinet-level official to any of its 
proceedings. The Arctic Council, while important for infrastructural improvement, 
environmental protection, and other social concerns, will likely never alter the domestic 
policy of Arctic nations. 
Scope 
This report will focus primarily on the “Arctic Five” (Canada, Denmark, Norway, 
Russia, and the United States) and their Arctic policies and postures. Given that these five 
nations are coastal Arctic states – that is, their maritime boundaries extend into the Arctic 
itself, their postures are most relevant in an American context. Other nations, such as 
Iceland, Finland, and Sweden, are indeed Arctic-adjacent nations, but are limited in their 
operational capacity due to their geographies, and as such will not be examined. Other 
observer states who have tenuous claims to being “Arctic Nations”, such as China and 
India, whose northernmost points are still further south than Norway’s southernmost 
point, will not be examined due to their tangential connection to the Arctic.  
36 Ljunggren, David. "Clinton Rebuke Overshadows Canada's Arctic Meeting." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 
29 Mar. 2010. Web. 
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The Russian Federation 
Domestic Policy 
The Russian government, and its predecessor in the Soviet Union, has always 
seen the Arctic as a uniquely Russian space. Many of the geographical features in the 
region, including those that are contested by multiple countries, bear the names of 
Russian explorers and historical figures. Beyond etymological origins, however, Russia 
has staked a firm claim to the majority of the Arctic Ocean. After acceding to the UN 
Convention of the Law of the Sea, Russia promptly claimed that its continental shelf – as 
part of the Eurasian continent – extended as far as the North Pole, including the 
Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev Ridge.37 The CLCS’s judges neither accepted nor 
denied the Russian claim, instead requesting more evidence regarding the Russian claim 
in the Okhotsk Sea, which Russia provided in February of 2013. The Commission has yet 
to decide on the matter of Russia’s Arctic Ocean claims. 
This has not prevented Russia from acting in the region. In August of 2007, a 
Russian scientific expedition named Arktika 2007 sent manned submersibles to the ocean 
floor beneath the North Pole and planted a Russian flag on the seabed. The expedition 
generated international outrage –a number of countries saw the incident as tantamount to 
Russia claiming the Arctic Ocean and the North Pole without regard for UNCLOS.38 
Indeed, the leader of the expedition, Artur Chilingarov himself declared that “The Arctic 
is Russian. We must prove the North Pole is an extension of the Russian continental 
37 "Submission by the Russian Federation." Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical 
Miles from the Baselines: Submissions to the Commission. United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and 
the Law of the Sea: Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 20 Dec. 2001. Web. 
38 "Russia Plants Flag on Arctic Floor." CNN. Cable News Network, Turner Broadcasting System, 4 Aug. 
2007. Web. 
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shelf”.39 Russian government officials have downplayed such claims, citing the 
expedition as a data-collecting excursion to support its CLCS claim.40 
Russia’s Arctic policy is defined by two major documents which define its 
general state and maritime policy in the region until 2020. Both documents see securing a 
foundation for future natural resource development and maritime shipping activities in 
the Russian Arctic zone as their primary focus.41 While the use of military force to secure 
Russian sovereignty is mentioned frequently and described at length in these policy 
documents, it is mainly defined in its relation to ensuring the “use of the Arctic zone…as 
a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation.”42 As such, Russian military and 
economic developments have not gone further than their current accepted international 
boundaries, and are mainly focused inwards, rather than outward. 
Economic Considerations 
Russia has already begun taking steps to develop the Arctic’s significant natural 
resources for itself. In 2013, state-owned energy production company Gazprom started 
production in the Prirazlomnoye oil field in Russia’s Pechora Sea, making Russia the first 
nation to being offshore oil development in the Arctic. The oil platform used is the first 
Arctic ice-resistant oil platform in the world.43 Gazprom similarly is working to develop 
the Shtokman oil field, a large undersea deposit in Russian waters north of the Bay of 
39 Reynolds, Paul. "Russia Ahead in Arctic Gold Rush." BBC News. British Broadcasting Corporation, 1 
Aug. 2007. Web. 
40 "Russia Plants Flag on Arctic Floor." CNN. 
41 Klimenko, Ekaterina. Russia’s Evolving Arctic Strategy: Drivers, Challenges and New Opportunities. 
Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014. Print. Position Paper 42. 
42 Translation from Russian of "Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the 
Period Till 2020 and for a Further Perspective" Arctic Resources and Transportation Information System 
Knowledge Hub. Centre for High North Logistics, 30 Mar. 2009. Web. 
43 "Prirazlomnoye Oil Field." Gazprom Projects. Gazprom. Web. 
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Kola into a production-capable facility by the end of 2015.44 Russia’s other major oil and 
gas companies, Lukoil and Rosneft, similarly are working on accelerating production in 
the Arctic, though have yet to progress past the development and prospecting stages.45 
Russia has also been steadily increasing the quality of its Arctic maritime 
infrastructure. Presently, the Port of Murmansk is the only Russian port open to year-
round operations on the Arctic Ocean. As the anchor of the proposed Northern Sea Route, 
the port is undergoing significant reconstruction and expansion of its shipping and 
container facilities, as well as its oil and coal terminals.46 It is also constructing the new 
Port of Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula. The port, which will be completed in 2016, is 
meant to facilitate the shipment of oil and gas from the Peninsula through the Northern 
Sea Route.47 
Most notable, however, is the quality of Russia’s icebreaking fleet. Presently, 
Russian state-owned company Atomflot owns and operates the world’s only six nuclear 
icebreakers, and the world’s only nuclear ice-strengthened cargo ship. Atomflot operates 
another 12 non-nuclear icebreakers in addition to its nuclear fleet.48 This capability gives 
it a near monopoly on escorting maritime traffic through the Northern Sea Route. These 
icebreakers also aid in the construction of oil and gas resource extraction in the Arctic, 
44 "Shtokman." Gazprom Projects. Gazprom. Web. 
45 Staalesen, Alte. "Lukoil Eyes New Arctic Licenses." Alaska Dispatch., 5 Feb. 2015. Web.; Gallucci, 
Maria. "Russian Oil Giant Rosneft Is Delaying Arctic Drilling Plans Amid Western Sanctions Against 
Moscow." International Business Times. IBT Media Incorporated, 30 Jan. 2015. Web. 
46 Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Presentation on "Potential of 
Social-Economic Development of Murmansk Region" Web. 
47 Staalesen, Alte. "In Russian Arctic, a New Major Sea Port." The Barents Observer. Norwegian Barents 
Secretariat, 6 Aug. 2012. Web. 
48 Padrtova, Barbora. Russian Approach Towards the Arctic Region. CENAA Analysis. Centre for 
European and North Atlantic Affairs, 2012. Web. 
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helping escort Gazprom construction crews and material to the Prirazlomnoye oil field.49 
That said, Russian icebreaking capability will diminish over time, as older icebreakers 
age out of the fleet. By 2020, only two icebreakers will remain in service – the NS Yamal 
and 50 Let Pobedy. Over the next decade, the Russian military does plan to build another 
five icebreakers, with an option for a further eight in the future.50 However, the 
icebreakers that were slated for delivery in 2014 and 2015 are in various stages of 
production even now, with a new estimated delivery time of 2025 in some cases. Indeed, 
even the intervention of Vladimir Putin himself has not helped the situation – though he 
announced the construction of the world’s largest icebreaker in 2013, production delays 
and cost overruns have resulted in a new anticipated delivery time of 2018 for just the 
one icebreaker.51 
Military Capabilities 
The icebreaker issue is concerning for Russia’s potential role as a guardian of the 
Northern Sea Route. As the most proximate nation to the NSR, Russia bears much of the 
burden for search and rescue operations, as well as oil spill response within the route.52 
Problematically for the Russians, the majority of its icebreakers and its patrol vessels are 
based with the bulk of the Northern Fleet in the Murmansk region, which is far west of 
the beginning of the Northern Sea Route. While Russia has announced the creation of 
two land-based Army brigades to be based in Murmansk and Archangelsk to help protect 
49 "Atomic Icebreaking Fleet Is The Key Element Of Russian Geopolitical Interests Protection In The 
Arctic." Northern Sea Route. Rosatom Flot. Web. 
50 United States of America. United States Coast Guard. Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy. Major 
Icebreakers of the World. 2013. Print. 
51 Staalesen, Alte. "Yard Delays Delivery of Icebreaker." Barents Observer 21 Nov. 2014. Print. 
52 "Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic". May 12, 
2011. Nuuk, Greenland. 
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the Northern Sea Route, these brigades have been delayed for the past four years, and are 
only just now beginning to deploy and receive Arctic training.53 These units are also 
naturally limited by the fact that protection of a maritime shipping route is generally a 
task best suited for naval units. 
The Russian Military has a clear northern focus in its policy and planning. The 
Navy’s Northern Fleet, headquartered near Murmansk, commands two thirds of the 
country’s nuclear force, and is larger and more powerful than all of its other three fleets 
combined.54 That said, while Russia’s primary naval assets are indeed based in 
Murmansk, they are still hindered by the ice. The Northern Fleet’s three cruisers and six 
destroyers have free reign of the northern regions in the summer months, but they lack 
operational capacity in the winter. Hypothetically, each of these ships could be escorted 
by one of Russia’s numerous icebreakers, but this plan is infeasible, given naval 
warfare’s reliance on basic maneuverability. Presently, the only ice-strengthened ships in 
the Russian armed forces are the eight Ivan Susanin and Purga-class icebreaker patrol 
ships in service with the Russian Maritime Border Guard. Though this outnumbers any 
other nations’ icebreaking patrol capacity, these vessels are stretched thin along Russia’s 
massive maritime zone of influence, especially given Russia’s need to patrol its non-
Arctic Pacific Ocean territory and the Baltic Sea. 
The Northern Fleet currently operates a number of medium and long-range anti-
submarine warfare aircraft, as well as a large number of reconnaissance and patrol 
53 Padrtova, Barbora. Russian Approach Towards the Arctic Region.; Petterson, Trude. "Russian Arctic 
Brigades Put off to 2015." Barents Observer. Norwegian Barents Secretariat, 22 Feb. 2012. Web. 
54 Laruelle, Marlène. Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
2014. Print. (120) 
21 
                                                                                                 
airframes.55 While Russia maintains a number of fighter and medium-range bomber 
aircraft, they lack the capacity for operations outside of the Russian Arctic, especially 
given the current semi-inoperability of the Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only aircraft 
carrier.56 Russia’s true operational might in the Arctic comes from its fleet of submarines. 
These submarines maintain the capability to retaliate against naval assets in the Arctic, as 
well as launch intercontinental ballistic missiles at targets in the continental United States 
and mainland Europe. However, here, the ice becomes an issue once again. While ice 
provides a crucial amount of cover for submarines evading anti-submarine aircraft or ship 
patrols, it also has the potential to physically limit the efficacy of any missile launches, 
rendering the submarines somewhat useless. Russia’s newest submarines, the Borey-
class, will deploy in large part to the Northern Fleet.57 
Russia’s main fleet of long-range bombers primarily operates from the Arctic 
area.58 These bombers have been receiving significant in-air time and training recently - 
since the annexation of Crimea, Russian bombers have provoked approximately 40 
separate incidents necessitating the scrambling of NATO fighter jets or other defense 
apparatuses.59 Most interestingly, Russia is planning the development and deployment of 
a “joint air and air defense army” in the Arctic, along with ten new airfields and radar 
55 Wezeman, Siemon T. "Military Capabilities in the Arctic." SIPRI Background Papers. Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, Mar. 2012. Web. 
56 Wezeman, Siemon T. "Military Capabilities in the Arctic."  
57 "Russian Nuclear Submarines to Resume Patrols in Southern Seas." United Press International. 3 June 
2013. Web. 
58 Engel's. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Global Security, 24 June 2011. Web. 
59 Frear, Thomas, Lukasz Kulesa, and Ian Kearns. Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters 
Between Russia and the West in 2014. Publications. European Leadership Network, 10 Nov. 2014. Web. 
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stations along the Arctic Circle.60 These installations will all fall under the purview of the 
new Arctic Joint Strategic Command, which is likely to administer the joint resources of 
the Russian North Fleet and any other army or air units needed in the region.61 Given the 
secretive nature of the Russian military structure, it remains unclear as to whether or not 
this new command will become another one of Russia’s top-level administrative military 
districts, or simply supplement a pre-existing one.62 
Further, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced on October 21, 2014 
plans to “have a large number of units deployed along the Arctic Circle, practically from 
Murmansk to Chukotka”.63 Though this may have been largely rhetoric – Shoigu’s 
remarks were, after all, at a meeting of top-level Russian military officers – they are at 
least somewhat mirrored by actual defensive fortification buildups. Recently, Russia 
began building two military bases along the Northern Sea Route on Wrangel Island and 
Cape Schmidt.64 The two locations are both proximate to the Bering Sea and functionally 
serve as gateways to the eastern Northern Sea Route. The complexes are being built in a 
star formation, a modern version of the invasion-proofed trace itaelienne.65 Russia is also 
rebuilding and reopening a number of Cold War-era fortifications, including an airport on 
Kotelny Island and an airport in Alakurtti near the Finnish border.66 In total, the 
60 "Russia to Form Air Army in Arctic in 2015: Army Chief." Sputnik News. Sputnik Online Media, 29 
Dec. 2014. Web. 
61 "Russia Activates New Arctic Joint Strategic Command." IHS Jane's 360. IHS Inc., 1 Dec. 2014. Web. 
62 "Joint Strategic Command." Military. Global Security, 2 Jan. 2015. Web. 
63 Jones, Bruce. "Shoigu Expands Arctic Military Presence, While Lavrov Rejects NATO Involvement in 
Far North." IHS Jane's 360. IHS Inc., 2 Oct. 2014. Web. 
64 Bodner, Matthew, and Alexey Ermenko. "Russia Starts Building Military Bases in the Arctic." The 
Moscow Times. 8 Sept. 2014. Web. 
65 ibid 
66 Braw, Elisabeth. "Putin Makes His First Move in Race to Control the Arctic." Newsweek. Newsweek 
LLC, 6 Jan. 2015. Web. 
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Federation’s State Armament Program seeks to build eight nuclear submarines, 600 
warplanes, 1,000 helicopters, and 100 naval vessels for addition into the Russian military 
by 2020.67  
However, the Russian military’s Arctic focus is greatly hindered by Russia’s 
generally dismal military apparatus. While defense spending increased by 500% between 
2000 and 2008, the Russian military still lacks the basic infrastructural tools necessary to 
bolster its military.68 The Admiral Kuznetsov is so in need of repairs and retrofit that the 
United States Navy’s Sixth Fleet is reputed to have been kept on high alert as the 
Kuznetsov sailed to the Mediterranean in 2013 in the event that it sank.69 Additionally, 
diplomatic concerns caused by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 have resulted in 
the loss of a number of defense deals for the Russian Armed Forces. Russia’s order of 
two Mistral-class helicopter carriers, for instance, is on temporary hold until French 
government officials approve a hand-over, and German officials have cancelled a $134 
million field simulator export project.70 Corruption frequently plagues the awarding of 
military contracts, recruitment, and maintenance, preventing the problem from being 
solved simply with additional funding.71 
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Analysis 
Russia’s rhetoric and actions in the Arctic region can best be described as 
bellicose. Its Deputy Prime Minister recently described the Arctic as “Russian Mecca”72, 
and the aforementioned military buildup in the region point to an aggressive Russian 
expansion into the space. This is somewhat true. Russia is certainly increasing its 
defensive capabilities in the Arctic space, but this expansion comes in tandem with a 
general rise in defense spending and capabilities after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 
1991. Indeed, Russia’s military expansion in general could instead be termed as a 
“return” to military capabilities. Its recent annexation of Crimea, for instance, returns the 
peninsula, and crucially the warm-water Port of Sevastopol to Russian control. As stated 
above, a majority of the military installations and facilities that Russia is building in the 
Arctic are really just reactivations of previous Soviet military bases. Even the Russian 
Army’s modernization of its rank system was a return to Soviet military ranks.73 Further, 
while many nations are exploring and considering the prospect of tapping into the 
Arctic’s massive oil and gas reserves, Russia’s opening of the Prirazlomnoye oil field is 
the first of any such ventures in the world. 
This military and economic expansion, however, is neither as threatening nor as 
dominant as it seems at first glance. As mentioned above, the Russian military suffers 
from massive corruption and inefficiencies, to the point where approximately 20-40% of 
Russia’s military hardware budget is stolen by defense officials and contractors 
72 Rogozin, Dmitry (Rogozin). "Арктика - русская Мекка" ("Arctic - Russian Mecca") trans. from 
Russian. 19 April 2015, 9:05 AM. Tweet 
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annually.74 Supposed Russian naval capabilities have also been marred by a number of 
recent Arctic failures. Two submarines, the K-159 and the Kursk, were both lost with all 
hands in the Barents Sea, and most Russian vessels have been in service for twenty 
years.75 The aforementioned Ivan Susanin-class icebreaking patrol ships are in a similar 
state of affairs as they have been in service since the mid-1970s. Given that the newer 
Purga-class patrol ships only serve in the Pacific Fleet, this means that Russia’s Arctic 
naval patrol capabilities are much weaker than they are made out to be. 
Even Gazprom’s expansion into the Prirazlomnoye oil field is somewhat 
asterisked by the fact that it took 20 years and 90 billion rubles ($2.5 billion) to start 
operations.76 Further, Russia lacks the ability to conduct further major exploratory 
drilling, given that the only Russian companies able to conduct exploratory drilling – 
ArktikmorNeftegazRazvedka (ANR) and Gazprom – own six drilling rigs in total.77 Of 
these, only ANR’s two rigs are meant for offshore use – Gazprom’s four rigs are all land-
based drilling rigs currently working in Eastern Siberia.78 Further, of ANR’s two drilling 
rigs, one is under contract for use in Vietnam until 2018, while the other is undergoing 
modernization to give it the capacity to be able to drill in Arctic waters.79 This combined 
with the simple fact that Arctic drilling comes with significantly larger (and more 
expensive) risk factors, means that Russia lacks the ability to exploit any of the 
significant oil and gas resources that lie in the Arctic waters. 
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 Regardless, the Arctic’s new role as a nascent exploitable resource area and 
shipping highway as opposed to a convenient location to store intercontinental ballistic 
missiles makes the Russian return to Soviet-level expenditure and attention in the region 
particularly salient. Russia is attempting to define the Arctic as a uniquely Russian space 
– especially by planting Russian flags at the bottom of the North Pole. However, Russia 
defines its military expansion as reactionary, rather than aggressive. In 2014, the Kremlin 
released a revised version of its military doctrine that referred to NATO expansion as “a 
fundamental threat to Russia”.80 Indeed, Russian troop mobilizations in the Arctic 
recently have been branded by Russian news sources as “responses” to NATO exercises 
in the region.81 Russia presents its expanding role in the Arctic as primarily defensive; 
the same military doctrine refers to the “protection” of “Russia’s national interests in the 
Arctic”, and all of Russia’s military buildup has been within undisputed Russian territory. 
This may seem paradoxical with Russia’s strong interest in international 
cooperation in the Arctic. Russian delegates to the Arctic Council, for instance, have been 
instrumental in crafting Search and Rescue agreements for the region, and have even 
shared the data used for the Russian submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf with other actors.82 This should not, however, be interpreted as a 
newfound Russian respect for international institutions. Instead, Russia’s ability to 
exploit any resources in the Arctic beyond those that lie within its Exclusive Economic 
Zone is entirely dependent on the adjudication of the CLCS. As such, Russia cannot take 
80 "New Russian Military Doctrine Labels NATO as Main Threat." Defense News. Gannett Company, 19 
Dec. 2014. Web. 
81 "Russian Military Exercises ‘Logical Response’ to NATO Troops on Its Border." RT. TV-Novosti, 18 
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any actions in the region that would be seen as circumventing the authority of both 
bodies, lest it jeopardize its own resources claims in the region. 
Canada 
Domestic Policy 
In 1985, the United States Coast Guard sent one of its icebreakers – the Polar Sea 
– through the Northwest Passage on a routine resupply mission. The voyage was 
controversial – the US government did not recognize Canada’s claim to the Passage, and 
therefore notified, rather than asked, the Canadian government of their plans. This went 
over quite poorly with the Canadian public. A national outcry called the American action 
a violation of national sovereignty, and Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs 
Joe Clark stated in Parliament “no icebreaker, even from one of the nations friendliest to 
Canada, will come into our territory and try to take our sovereignty away from us”.83  
The dispute was resolved three years later with the Agreement on Arctic 
Cooperation, a short, two-paragraph statement that merely stated that its icebreakers 
would in future ask for permission from the Canadian government before transiting 
“waters claimed by Canada”.84 The agreement is a minor addition to the litany of 
international accords between Canada and the United States. However, it is notable in 
that it demonstrates the lengths to which Canada is willing to go to defend its Arctic 
sovereignty. Indeed, in 2009, the Parliament of Canada renamed the waterway the 
“Canadian Northwest Passage”, and in its Northern Strategy policy document, the 
83 Briggs, P. J. "The Polar Sea Voyage and the Northwest Passage Dispute." Armed Forces & Society 16.3 
(1990): 437-52. Web. 
84 United States and Canada. Arctic Cooperation: Agreement between the United States of America and 
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Canadian government specifically outlined “exercising our Arctic sovereignty” as a top 
policy priority in Northern Canada.85 Canada is committed to ensuring that its slice of the 
Arctic – especially the Northwest Passage – remains, and can be defended as, 
unequivocally Canadian. 
Canada has been defending the Arctic as a Canadian space on the international 
stage. Canada was the most vehement objector to the Russian Arktika 2007 expedition, 
which planted a Russian flag on the seabed underneath the North Pole. Canadian Foreign 
Minister Peter MacKay’s reaction to the expedition was “this isn't the 15th Century… 
you can't go around the world and just plant flags and say 'We're claiming this 
territory'”.86 In December 2013, the Canadian government filed a claim with the 
UNCLOS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf staking its claim to a large 
portion of the Arctic Ocean.87 While it has not yet completed the scientific work 
necessary to delineate its claims in the Arctic Ocean, the Canadian government plans to 
eventually stake a claim on the North Pole and the disputed Lomonosov Ridge with the 
CLCS as well.88 Canada’s claim triggered partial objections from the United States, 
Denmark, and France, who all objected to overlaps in claimed territory.  
Canada and the United States both dispute their respective maritime borders near 
Alaska and Yukon in the Beaufort Sea. Canada claims that the border falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Treaty of Saint Petersburg, which created a maritime boundary 
85 "Canada's Northern Strategy." Prime Minister of Canada, 16 Aug. 2013. Web. 29 Mar. 2015.; Parliament 
of Canada. 40-2 Vote No. 140 (Canadian Northwest Passage). 40th Parliament., 2nd sess. Private 
Member’s Business M-387. 140. 2 Dec. 2009. Web. 29 Mar. 2015. 
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between then-British Canada and then-Russian Alaska in 1825. However, the United 
States claims that maritime boundaries must be equidistant from land boundaries, 
resulting in a triangular disputed area. The area is of immense value, potentially holding 
1.7 billion cubic meters of gas – enough to supply Canada’s needs for 20 years.89 While 
the dispute is not an intense one, it does have larger implications. Currently, the United 
States and Canada are free to solve the issue independently. However, if the United States 
were to accede to UNCLOS, the International Tribunal of the UNCLOS would have a 
binding judicial mandate on the issue. 
Canada and Denmark also dispute the ownership of Hans Island, a small, rocky 
outcropping located in between Northern Greenland and Ellesmere Island. The island is 
presently of little strategic or resource value, especially given its miniscule size (the 
island is approximately half a square mile). The dispute is similarly not an intense one – 
neither Canada nor Denmark has devoted many resources to its settlement, and the 
argument has been referred to as “one of the world’s friendliest border disputes”.90 
However, as a dispute between two Arctic nations, the issue could set a legal precedent 
for future border disputes in the region. If Canada or Denmark were to relinquish its 
claim on the island it could be seen as establishing a legal precedent for it giving up other 
similar territorial claims in other areas with more resources.91  
The international community and Canada disagree regarding the status of the 
Northwest Passage and its potential status as an internal waterway. As outlined in 
89 Lewis-Koskinen, Simone. "U.S. - Canada Dispute Over Offshore Territory."Inventory of Conflict and 
Environment. American University, Dec. 2010. Web. 06 Nov. 2014. 
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UNCLOS, a nation has a claim to administer and regulate all resources and passage 
within its internal waters. Foreign vessels do not have the right of transit in these waters, 
meaning that Canada potentially has the legal right to limit and regulate passage through 
the Northwest Passage. The United States and the European Union hold that the 
Northwest Passage qualifies as an international strait – similar to the Straits of Hormuz or 
Malacca – and therefore is subject to the UNCLOS guidelines of innocent passage. While 
Canada would still have the right to enforce any sort of economic, environmental, and 
judicial guidelines, it would not have the right to bar passage to non-military vessels. 
Canada, by contrast, holds that the Northwest Passage is internal waters, with its military 
referring to the waterway as “Canadian Internal Waters”.92 The dispute has implications 
beyond the lucrative ability to control passage through a global shipping route. Russia 
similarly considers aspects of the Northern Sea Route to be within its internal waters; a 
decision regarding the Northwest Passage would set a legal precedent for administration 
of the Northern Sea Route.93 
Economic Considerations 
Canadian exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic is similarly limited by a 
strong sense of environmental protectionism within Canada. While the disputed wedge of 
ocean in the Beaufort Sea remains untapped due to legal concerns and the hesitancy of 
companies to invest in a region that may switch nationalities at any given moment, other 
Arctic resources that are undisputedly Canadian are protected by strict environmental 
92 "Northwest Passage Gets Political Name Change." Canada.com. The Edmonton Journal, 9 Apr. 2006. 
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laws. A significant aspect of the Northern Strategy is the need for environmental 
protection in the Arctic. Accordingly, the Canadian Parliament expanded the area 
protected by the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970 to include the entirety of 
Canada’s Exclusive Economic Zone.94 The act, and its strict environmental regulations, 
has largely prevented the expansion of offshore drilling programs in the Arctic area. 
Further complicating any Canadian exploitation of Arctic natural resources is the 
difficulties associated with offshoring drilling in the Arctic environment. The majority of 
Canada’s offshore drilling enterprises ceased in the 1970s, after low production and 
increasing costs made the ventures unprofitable.95 Though American oil company Devon 
Energy discovered a sizeable oil field in 2007 in the Beaufort Sea in Canada’s first 
drilling operation in, it has not yet been able to extract any oil from the field.96 A number 
of energy companies have applied for permits from the Canadian government to drill in 
the Beaufort Sea, but Canada’s National Energy Board has yet to approve the permits 
necessary to begin drilling. 
Military Capabilities 
Canada’s Arctic military presence, however, currently lags behind its rhetoric. At 
present, for instance, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) operates primarily in 
Southern Canada, with only four northern “Forward Operating Locations” (FOLs) that 
94 Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. Canada’s Arctic Policy. The Canada US Institute. The University of Western 
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95 "A Look at Dome Petroleum’s Ill-fated Drilling Program in the Beaufort Sea." Alberta Oil Magazine. 26 
Feb. 2014. Web. 
96 "Devon's Paktoa a Giant Beaufort Oil Find." Oil and Gas Journal. PennWell Corporation, 26 Oct. 2013. 
Web. 
32 
                                                                                                 
are host to four small search and rescue (SAR) airframes.97 While the FOLs were built to 
house Canadian F-18s if necessary, jets dedicated to maintaining Canadian air 
sovereignty – especially from Russian Arctic aerial activity – are still stationed in south-
Central and southeastern Canada. While its military receives cold weather training and 
basic instruction in Arctic warfare, its primary force in the region are the Canadian 
Rangers, a volunteer group made up primarily of Canada’s Inuit, First Nations, and Métis 
populations that still uses World War Two era equipment for surveillance operations. 
To help improve Canada’s Arctic military presence, the Canadian Ministry of 
Defence adopted the “Canada First Defence Strategy” in 2008. The strategy is a lengthy 
policy document that lists “Conduct[ing] daily domestic and continental operations…in 
the Arctic” as its first priority through 2028.98 Accordingly, in 2010, Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper’s government announced its intention to replace Canada’s 80 F-18s with 
65 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, though amidst domestic controversy, no deal has yet been 
signed.99 The RCAF also operates 18 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft in the 
Arctic, which will be replaced with 10-12 new airframes by 2020.100 These additions will 
add to Canada’s early warning and signal intelligence capabilities in the Arctic. Currently 
these roles are filled by the NORAD North Warning System – a system of 15 long-range 
97 Fergusson, James. "Up in the Air, North of 60." The National Post. Postmedia Network Inc., 6 Feb. 
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radars in northern North America – and Canadian Forces Station, Alert; an early warning 
base on the tip of Ellesmere Island.101 
Canada’s Defence First budget similarly outlines special expenditures for the 
modernization of its naval assets. The budget specifically mentions the purchase of 6-8 
Arctic/offshore patrol ships by the Royal Canadian Navy to supplement the new ASW 
airframes purchased by the RCAF.102 Construction on the ships will begin in September 
of 2015.103 The Canadian Navy similarly has begun construction on an Arctic refueling 
port for its vessels on Baffin Island, which would be the only Canadian facility of its kind 
within the Arctic Circle. The facility, which was originally slated to be a fully functional 
deep-water port, would serve to refuel Arctic patrols by 2018.104 
Analysis 
Canadian Arctic rhetoric and militarization demonstrates Canada’s strong desire 
to demarcate the Arctic – or at least its most lucrative parts – as Canadian territory. 
Though much of Canada’s military buildup in the Arctic is still in the planning stages – it 
will be many years before F-35s begin using FOL Yellowknife as bases from which to 
patrol the Arctic – the military buildup is a huge difference from years past. Canada’s 
military involvement in the Arctic was formerly limited to its joint partnership with the 
United States in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and 
intercepting Soviet bombers off their northern coast. However, the rapid buildup of their 
101 Fergusson, James. "Up in the Air, North of 60." The National Post. Postmedia Network Inc., 6 Feb. 
2013. Web. 
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naval and aviation assets in the Arctic indicates a Canadian desire to match the opening 
of the Arctic with an ability to police their section of it. 
Canadian Arctic ambitions, however, are somewhat tempered by the fact that the 
Northwest Passage is much slower to open to maritime traffic than the rest of the Arctic. 
By 2030, for instance, the NWP will only be somewhat free of sea ice for 11 weeks per 
year, in contrast to Russia’s Northern Sea Route, which will face similar conditions for 
19 weeks per year. Further, while there is a significant Russian population within the 
Arctic Circle that lives on the Northern Sea Route, 90% of Canadians live within 100 
miles of the border with the United States, meaning that Canada lacks an existing urban 
infrastructure in its Arctic environment.105 
It is unclear what actual strategic effect the Canadian military expansion may be 
able to have in the region. Whereas Russia’s major regional issue is an absence of 
military capacity in its Arctic zone, the Canadian military may face an issue in which 
their military expansion is ineffective. Canadian government officials have criticized the 
acquisition of the new Arctic patrol ships as they may be too small and underpowered to 
be suitable for heavy icebreaking.106 Other Canadian officials are unhappy with the fact 
that the patrol vessel acquisition comes under the control of the Canadian Navy, feeling 
instead that they should have been purchased on behalf of the Canadian Coast Guard.107 
105 "By the Numbers." CBC News. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 12 Mar. 2009. Web. 
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Given the fact that the ships have yet to be acquired, the inter-service squabble leaves the 
status of these ships in limbo. 
As much as Canada’s rhetoric may be centered on the primacy of its claim in the 
Arctic and its ownership of the Northwest Passage, it is still a key partner with the United 
States in major international affairs. Both Canada and the United States are members of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), meaning that they share a strong 
commitment to each other’s political and defense enterprises. The militaries conduct 
joint-military exercises and cooperate with each other in policy creation and defense 
planning, meaning that, despite chest-thumping rhetoric from Ottawa regarding  the 
Northwest Passage and the dispute over the Beaufort wedge, the United States and 
Canada can be counted on as strong Arctic partners. Indeed, when referring to other 
nations in the Arctic, the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development 
specifically refers to the United States as Canada’s “premier partner”, indicating that the 
only sticking point in the US-Canada Arctic relationship is the Northwest Passage and the 
Beaufort wedge.108 As the United States builds its own independent military capacity in 
the Arctic, it is doing so in conjunction, rather than competition with Canadian efforts. 
The Kingdom of Denmark 
Domestic Policy 
A discussion of Arctic policy for most nations usually begins with an analysis of 
their military buildup and capabilities in the region. Both Canada and Russia, for 
instance, have Arctic policies that are characterized by their drastic growth in Arctic 
108 "International Arctic Partners." Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development. Government of 
Canada, 15 Mar. 2013. Web. 
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military capability. Interestingly, however, Denmark’s primary concerns in the Arctic 
seem to be its sustainability and environmental quality. In a speech at Dartmouth College, 
for instance, the Danish Ambassador to the United States, Peter Taksoe-Jensen stated that 
the best approach to the Arctic moving forward is “to actually have a framework where 
we can manage the challenges and opportunities by working together”.109  
This is not mere rhetoric – Denmark’s claim to the Arctic comes from its 
administration of Greenland, where native Greenlanders comprise 89% of the island’s 
population. Denmark’s relationship with Greenland is unique – though Greenland is an 
autonomous country with its own government, parliament, and a legally distinct 
populace, Denmark is largely responsible for administration of the island, and has 
oversight over the Greenlander people.110 Greenlanders are traditionally wary of external 
forces dictating native policy. A 1953 expansion of the United States’ Thule Air Force 
Base, for instance, resulted in the forced removal of an entire Greenlander village with 
four days of notice. Though the agreement has since been amended to guarantee Danish 
and Greenlander oversight over American military activities on the island, the base 
expansion continues to be a sore subject for Greenlanders, who continue to file lawsuits 
in the Danish Supreme Court and protest the base’s existence.111 More recently, the 
Premier of Greenland boycotted a meeting of the Arctic Council in protest of the fact that 
109 Bennett, Mia. "Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic." Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic., 14 Nov. 2011. 
Web. 
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Greenland lacks a voting role on the Council.112 As such, Denmark must maintain a 
special focus on the needs and desires of the Greenlander people, lest it lose its only 
connection to the Arctic by alienating a population that is legally and culturally distinct 
from its own. Its public strategy document outlining its approach to the Arctic between 
2011 and 2020 demonstrates as much – it is signed as a multilateral directive between the 
governments of Denmark, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland. 
Accordingly, Denmark leads the field in ensuring the continued “sustainable 
growth and social sustainability” of the Arctic.113 Its Arctic policy document, for 
instance, outlines a number of mandatory systems that it has adopted or is in the process 
of adopting to improve maritime safety and reduce shipping accidents. This appears to be 
a higher priority than military expansion (detailed below), especially given that subjects 
such as maritime safety, ecology, and native peoples’ rights form the bulk of the policy 
document, whereas military maneuvers and strategy are given a vague and obtuse three 
pages. 
Denmark is attempting to partner with several nations, beyond the obvious 
military partnership with NATO and the United States, due to the latter’s military 
presence in Greenland, to achieve the above goals. It is leading the charge within the 
International Maritime Organization to create more stringent and effective shipping laws, 
and mandates that all vessels sailing to Greenland report their location at all times in a 
112 "Greenland’s Premier Boycotts the Arctic Council in “Drastic” Protest." Nunatsiaq Online., 15 May 
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113 Kingdom of Denmark. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–
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GPS-based monitoring system to prevent accidents.114 Internally, Denmark is partnering 
with Russia to help chart unmapped areas of the ocean floor between Greenland and 
Russia.115 
This is not to say that Denmark lacks unilateral interests. In December of 2014, it 
– similar to Russia and Canada – submitted a claim to the Lomonosov Ridge to the UN 
Commission on the Laws of the Continental Shelf.116 While the Commission has yet to 
pass any form of judgment on the Danish claim, its acceptance would mean that Denmark 
would exercise near-total control over the Arctic region, especially due to its adjoining 
claim of the area east of Greenland. 
Economic Considerations 
Denmark’s potential economic advantages from the Arctic come largely from its 
association with Greenland. Greenland possesses vast oil and gas resources off its Eastern 
coast – a United States Geological Survey study estimated the East Greenland Rift Basin 
area to have some of the largest reserves of oil in the world.117 Danish energy interests 
have a newly increased interest in tapping into these fields, especially as production from 
the Danish North Sea diminishes annually since peaking in 2005.118 Problematically, 
however, for Danish drilling ventures in the region, the East Greenland Rift Basin is 
plagued by consistent Arctic ice, with the majority of the area being encapsulated within 
114 Bennett, Mia. "Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic." 
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the standard Arctic ice extent annually.119 One region in Greenland, the West Disko tract, 
remains ice-free year-round and a potential source of cheap Greenlandic resource 
extraction.120 Danish resource development in the Arctic region has also been delayed by 
the fall in the price of oil, and is unlikely to return unless the price of oil rebounds to a 
high enough point where profits will justify investment. 
There are political obstacles to resource extraction in Greenland as well. While all 
offshores resources are in the Danish Exclusive Economic Zone, the government of 
Greenland retains ultimate control of all resource exploration licenses in the region, 
which has led to confusion in the region. Greenland’s government, for instance, placed a 
moratorium on oil drilling in 2013 to the dismay of the Danish government, only to 
reverse its position in order to utilize revenues from oil and gas development in order to 
gain more financial independence.121 This, in conjunction with environmental difficulties, 
has left the region underdeveloped. 
Military Capabilities 
Similarly, Denmark is not shying away from military expansion in the region, 
especially in Greenland. It recently decided to combine its military commands in 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands into one unified Arctic Command in order to streamline 
and create a unified military structure in the Arctic region.122 This command’s main role 
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thus far has been “upgrading…to support the planning and execution of major operations, 
as in connection with the deployment of an Arctic preparedness force.”123 This ‘Arctic 
preparedness force’ is also a new military expansion intended specifically to be a rapid 
response force for “enforcement of sovereignty and surveillance” of Danish territories 
while maintaining the ability to partner with other external NATO forces in the region.124 
These structural expansions bolster an extant military defense network based in 
Greenland. At present, Denmark’s Arctic military presence is minimal, especially 
considering that it has only been mentioned in defense planning documents since 2010. 
The longest operating permanent military presence in the region, for instance is provided 
by Slædepatrulje Sirius, a unit of 14 Danish soldiers who ride around Northeastern 
Greenland on dogsleds conducting sovereignty enforcement patrols for months at a 
time.125 Of additional note is Station Nord, a five-person scientific station in Northeastern 
Greenland that is the second-most northern permanent settlement in the world.126 Beyond 
this, the recently established Arctic Command has a small administrative presence in 
Nuuk, Greenland, and a liaison unit with the American military base at Thule.127   
Denmark has recently realigned a portion of its air assets to have a permanent 
Arctic presence. Whereas Air Group West, which hosts Denmark’s F-16 fighter jets, only 
used Kangerlussuaq Airport in Western Greenland for temporary stopovers and training 
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exercises in the past, it now maintains a permanent presence there.128 Additional 
maritime patrol craft also operate in the Arctic from Aalborg Air Base in mainland 
Denmark. While Thule Air Force Base is a United States military asset, the Danish 
military retains the ability to station troops and air assets there, if necessary.129 
Denmark’s naval capabilities are more robust than its air or land divisions. The 
Royal Danish Navy maintains an active naval base in southern Greenland – Kanginnguit. 
From Kanginnguit, the Danish Navy conducts regular sovereignty patrols within the 
Arctic space with its three specially built ice-hardened Knud Rasmussen class “Inspection 
Ships”.130 These ships are specifically meant for Arctic patrols off the coast of 
Greenland, and to replace Denmark’s three ice-strengthened cutters (of which one 
remains in service in Greenland).131 There are currently two Knud Rasmussen class 
vessels in service, with a third planned to enter service by 2017. 132 These patrol ships all 
will serve as platforms for the Danish Navy’s nine Sikorsky Seahawks, which have the 
capability to conduct anti-surface and submarine warfare, search and rescue, and general 
surveillance.133 The Danish Navy similarly has four Thetis class frigates meant to 
resupply Danish forces in Greenland and work as light icebreakers.134 Finally, the Navy 
operates two medium icebreakers primarily for research and resupply operations 
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Analysis 
The nuances of the Denmark-Greenland relationship complicate Denmark’s 
Arctic aspirations. As stated above, Greenlandic politics led to a temporary moratorium 
on Arctic drilling which was only lifted to reduce Greenlandic reliance on Danish 
monetary aid. Corporate hesitancy over drilling in Greenland goes further than questions 
over politics; a recent fall in oil prices has made companies reluctant to invest the 
massive amounts of capital required to start production in the ice-filled waters in 
Greenland, with some even returning the their offshore exploration licenses.135 Danish 
Arctic military expansion is couched in a desire to protect Greenland’s Arctic resources 
and help police its Arctic claims. The expansion, however, is controversial, even within 
the ranks of the Danish military. In a strongly-worded rebuke of Denmark’s military 
expansion, the former Commander of the Danish Greenlandic Command notes that 
Denmark’s peace with the other Arctic nations – as he puts it, “the closest the Kingdom 
of Denmark has been to getting into a territorial conflict since 1864 [was when] the 
Canadian military removed a Danish flag from Hans Island”.136  
The Kingdom of Norway 
Domestic Policy 
Norway’s Arctic regions have been at the forefront of its government policy 
focuses since the country’s modern inception in 1905. Its northernmost county of 
Finnmark has always been a front-line against Russian and Soviet incursions and its 
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administration of the archipelago of Svalbard was the subject of international debate and 
a treaty involving a litany of countries in 1920. These characteristics make Norway’s 
relationship with the Arctic unique – whereas many nations are only now discovering the 
value of their Arctic connection, the Norwegians have always been cognizant and closely 
connected to the Arctic. Indeed, most government documents refer to the Finnmark, 
Svalbard, and the island of Jan Meyen as “The High North” or simply “North Norway”. 
Despite this, however, Norway’s Arctic sovereignty is tenuous and limited. 
Though its administration of Finnmark and the associated Exclusive Economic Zone is 
unmistakable given its contiguity with the rest of the country, Svalbard is the subject of a 
nearly century-old treaty that severely limits Norway’s capability to use the archipelago 
as a base for future Arctic operations. For much of Svalbard’s (then referred to as 
Spitsbergen) history, the archipelago was terra nullus – a land without a nation.137 Over 
time, numerous international interests began using the archipelago as a base of operations 
for whaling, coaling, and Arctic exploration, creating the need for some form of 
governance. The 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty placed Svalbard under Norwegian 
administration, but preserved the terra nullus rights of signatory nations. 
While the area is completely under Norwegian control, Norway must allow any 
treaty nation to become residents of the archipelago and undertake any form of 
commercial or mining activity they desire.138 Further, it is prohibited from establishing 
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“any naval base [or]…fortification in the said territories…for warlike purposes”.139 The 
treaty has created an odd situation for the Norwegian government today, wherein it is 
responsible for the upkeep and preservation of a Russian mining settlement, Barentsburg, 
on its own sovereign territory without being able to use it for non-commercial purposes. 
Russia continues to prove the point that Svalbard is not under Norway’s sovereign 
control – Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin visited the archipelago in April 
of 2015, despite having travel sanctions placed on him by the European Union and 
Norway.140 
The Treaty of Svalbard also leaves the archipelago open to foreign construction 
and presence. In 2014, a Chinese businessman proposed buying a large tract of land on 
the main island for “business purposes”.141 The Chinese have also attempted to create a 
large radar installation on Svalbard in the past, though this attempt has been repeatedly 
rebuffed by the Norwegian government. In Ny-Ålesund, a research town in northwestern 
Svalbard, ten different countries, ranging from China and India to Japan and South 
Korea, conduct unfettered scientific research on the archipelago.142 
This multilateralism is mirrored on a larger diplomatic stage. For example, in 
2010, Norway and Russia resolved a forty-year maritime border dispute in the Barents 
Sea, and have participated in a fisheries management program in the Barents Sea since 
1976. Most incredibly for a border zone that was once the dividing line of the NATO-
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USSR conflict; Norwegian authorities have proposed a special ID for border region 
residents allowing them to cross the border without visas and in an expedited manner.143 
The relationship has been strained recently, with Norway suspending bilateral military 
activities with Russia due to the annexation of Crimea.144 Beyond Russia, Norway has 
hosted five different “Cold Response” military exercises simulating a hypothetical 
military conflict in a cold weather scenario. These exercises are open to NATO member 
states, and have been held semi-regularly since 2006.145 Further, under former Prime 
Minister Jens Stoltenberg’s Secretary Generalship of NATO, Norway has begun to host 
more NATO military exercises, with a new “high-visibility” exercise scheduled for 2018. 
This has not prevented Norway from attempting to ensure the sovereignty of 
Svalbard and its other Arctic holdings. In the 2007 Soria Moria Declaration, the 
Norwegian government declared the High North as “Norway’s most important strategic 
target area in the years to come”.146 This emphasis on Arctic operations is visible with the 
move of the Norwegian Defence Headquarters, the Norwegian Coast Guard’s 
headquarters, and major elements of the Norwegian Army to bases north of the Arctic 
Circle.147 On a political side, Norway has filed two submissions with the UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, claiming the “Southern Banana 
Hole” and the “Loop Hole”, two swaths of ocean surrounding Svalbard. These claims are 
somewhat controversial – the 1920 Treaty of Svalbard did not clarify the status of the 
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waters surrounding the archipelago, and as such Norway’s claim has come under 
additional scrutiny. 
Economic Considerations 
Norway’s economy is largely based on natural resource development in the North 
Sea. It generates massive state revenues from its North Sea extraction; to the point there it 
has created a sovereign wealth fund to fund Norwegian social programs entirely from 
petroleum revenue.148 Additionally, Norway’s position near the Barents Sea makes it 
well-placed to take advantage of the natural resources in the area. It is currently 
developing a liquefied natural gas plant on the island of Melkøya to harvest the massive 
natural gas reserves of the Snøhvit field. The Snøhvit operation is the first of its kind in 
the Barents Sea.149 Norway’s state-owned petroleum enterprise, Statoil, has drilled over 
100 exploration wells in the Barents Sea, and plans even more for the future.150 Until 
recently, however, Norway did not allow the exploitation of Barents Sea resources, citing 
environmental concerns in the region.151 Given potentially diminishing returns in the 
North Sea, Norway is seeking to invest more in the Barents region, opening its first round 
of exploitation and production licenses in 2016.152  
Military Capabilities 
Norway’s army, while small, is primarily oriented towards Arctic operations. Its 
one army brigade – Brigade Nord (North) – is stationed north of the Arctic Circle in 
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Troms County, and conducts Arctic training exercises frequently, as in the 
aforementioned Cold Response NATO exercise.153 However, the military lacks the 
capability to enforce and patrol the large Arctic claims it has promulgated. While the Air 
Force has 60 F-16 fighter jets – with 56 F-35s on order, these aircrafts’ capabilities are 
largely neutered given the Air Force’s lack of tanker aircraft that would allow them to 
patrol outside of mainland Norway.154 Additionally, its P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft 
are few and in need of replacement –a recent refurbishment added 20-25 years to their 
service life, but the fact that there are only six airframes in service limits their 
capability.155  
The Norwegian Navy and Coast Guard similarly face an Arctic capabilities gap. 
Only one of its naval ships – the NoCGV Svalbard, possesses the ability to break the ice. 
The rest of its naval fleet is comprised of five Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates which are 
neither ice-strengthened nor generally functional. A number of the frigates have been 
berthed at length due to a lack of spare parts, and one has been partially cannibalized in 
order to have its parts sent to the other frigates.156 Despite the problems, these frigates are 
intended to operate within the entire Norwegian operating space, Arctic or otherwise. The 
Navy additionally operates six Ula-class submarines, which have a similar, limited, 
Arctic capability.157 The Navy plans the purchase of a large logistics support ship in 
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order to facilitate future Arctic operations, as well as supplement the operational 
capabilities of the Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates.158 
Analysis 
Norway is in a unique situation amongst the Arctic nations. Due to its 
administration of Svalbard, it finds itself forced to accept other countries using territory it 
administers as a base of operations for their own Arctic expansion. Norway also is legally 
limited in its response – while it may want to protect Norwegian interests on Svalbard 
with a local military buildup, it is prohibited from doing so by the Spitsbergen Treaty. As 
such Norwegian military expansion must be done from their own mainland, without 
using the advantages of the Arctic territory it possesses. Notably, however, it is perfectly 
able to patrol and maintain its Barents Sea holdings, considering its proximity to the 
Norwegian mainland. 
Curiously, Norway’s military capacity in the Arctic is limited by more than just 
international law. Even though Norway is a strong NATO partner with a strong public 
opinion of the military, Norway’s military capacity in the region is severely limited.159 Its 
navy especially is in huge need of improvements and addition, considering the significant 
amount of Arctic coastline that it has. Currently, as seen by the flawed acquisition of the 
Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates, Norway has a weak navy that lacks the capacity to protect 
its own Arctic holdings and potentially deter its eastern neighbor, Russia.  
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CHAPTER THREE: DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS  
Domestic Policy and Posture 
The United States lacks a clear direction and vision for its Arctic future. Thus far, 
there have been only three governmental policy statements on the region. The first, a 
Nixon-era memorandum, proposed a few platitudes regarding international cooperation 
and established the Interagency Arctic Policy Group, a group meant to coordinate and 
advise implementation of US Arctic policy.160 Since 1990, this group has been limited to 
defining and implementing scientific research in the Arctic.161  
The next document, a Presidential Directive authorized by President George W. 
Bush in the last few days of his presidency, continues to be the most substantive Arctic 
policy statement issued by the US to date. The directive, referred to as NSPD-66, 
affirmed the  United States’ need to accede to UNCLOS, but more crucially rejected the 
concept of an independently negotiated treaty for the Arctic region, similar to the 
Antarctic.162 The Antarctic treaty prevents any nations other than those who already had 
territorial claims to the Antarctic at the time of the treaty’s signing from establishing any 
new territorial claims to the Antarctic.163 As such, given the United States has not 
acceded to UNCLOS and has no legal claim to any Arctic maritime zones, an Arctic 
Treaty in the pattern of the Antarctic treaty could permanently lock the United States out 
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of the Arctic. The document also defines the Northwest Passage and parts of the Northern 
Sea Route as international straits as defined by UNCLOS, something that contradicts the 
Arctic policies of Canada and Russia respectively. 
The following document, the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, is a brief 
document from the administration of President Barack Obama that largely reaffirms the 
statements made in NSPD-66, while adding a minimal amount of substance to certain 
environmental guidelines.164 As such, American Arctic policy continues to be defined by 
a presidential directive authorized by a President eleven days from the end of his term. 
President Obama authorized an Executive Order in January of 2015 authorizing the 
creation of an Arctic Executive Steering Committee to provide guidance and coordination 
between executive departments and agencies, the Alaskan government, tribal 
stakeholders, and other Alaskan Native organizations in Arctic policy.165 This Committee 
is still in the planning process, and has not yet formally convened.166 
At present, American accession to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea is 
largely blocked by domestic political concerns. Accession has large bipartisan and 
multilateral support, with both Presidents Bush and Obama in favor of American 
ratification, as well as former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, former Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin 
164 United States of America. The Office of the President. National Strategy for the Arctic Region. 2013. 
Print. 
165 Exec. Order No. 13689, 3 C.F.R. (2015). Print. 
166 Conley, Heather A. "What to Know about the New White House Executive Order on Enhancing 
Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic." Center for Strategic and International Studies. 22 Jan. 
2015. Web. 
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Dempsey.167 Opposition to the treaty comes from Senate Republicans, who see the 
convention as infringing upon the national sovereignty of the United States – even 
referring to the treaty as LOST (Law of the Sea Treaty) as opposed to UNCLOS.168 
Curiously, the opposition to UNCLOS after its initial publication was only concerned 
with Article XI of the treaty, which gives the International Seabed Authority (ISA) the 
right to distribute mining rights from waters outside of any one nation’s territory.169 After 
renegotiating the agreement to allow the United States a permanent seat on the governing 
council of the ISA, a move that would have allowed effective US veto power over any 
redistribution agreements, the United States signed the treaty and recognized the 
convention as international law. However, Senate refusal to ratify the treaty means that 
the protections and rights afforded to UNCLOS members are still not extended to the 
United States. 
Within the State Department, the Arctic continues to be a low priority. Internally, 
the office responsible for handling Arctic issues is nestled within a series of different 
offices that report to the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and 
Environment, rather than the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who normally is 
responsible for diplomatic affairs. This does, however, appear to be changing. In 2014, 
Secretary of State John Kerry appointed retired Coast Guard Admiral Robert Papp to 
serve as the United States Special Representative for the Arctic. In this role, the admiral 
167 Patrick, Stewart M. "(Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should Ratify the Law of the Sea 
Treaty." The Atlantic. The Atlantic Monthly Group, 10 June 2012. Web. 
168 Inhofe, Jim. "If the U.S. Joins LOST, the U.S. Would Become Environmental Lawsuit Target 
#1." Senator James M. Inhofe. Senate of the United State of America, 28 June 2012. Web. 
169 Statement of Roger Rufe: President, The Ocean Conservancy {Private}, Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. (2003) (testimony of Roger Rufe). Print. 
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has begun meeting with various stakeholders in the Arctic Council in preparation for the 
recent US assumption of the Arctic Council chairmanship. As the United States’ Senior 
Arctic Official (SAO), Papp will be responsible for administering the Council and 
representing the interests of the United States in its proceedings.  
Economic Considerations 
As with any other Arctic nation, the United States has much to gain economically 
in the Arctic. Even though the only Arctic shipping route that the United States has 
access to is the Bering Strait (which it jointly administers with Russia), it stands to gain 
massive returns from natural resource extraction. On land, natural resources fall into the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), a protected zone where drilling or other 
resource development is completely forbidden.  Offshore, the typical Arctic mélange of 
problems exist – ranging from expensive infrastructural investments to the difficulty of 
drilling in Arctic weather conditions. Currently, no offshore drilling rigs exist in the 
Arctic, though Shell Oil plans to resume drilling in the Beaufort Sea two years after a 
series of minor accidents in the Arctic.   
The National Strategy for the Arctic Region places an emphasis on “responsibly 
develop[ing] Arctic oil and gas resources”, which is reflected in recently adopted 
landmark federal regulations for Arctic drilling.  Notably, however, there are not vast 
reserves of oil and gas immediately available to American energy interests. The ANWR 
only holds enough oil to supply the United States for a year, and the international legal 
dispute over the Beaufort Wedge means that no company is willing or able, to attempt to 
extract the resources below.  Further, access to potential oil reserves further afield is 
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made difficult by the lack of domestic icebreaking capacity – if oil exists, there is 
currently no way for American drilling operations to access it. 
Military Strategy and Policy 
The United States’ military has a large and visible trajectory in the Arctic. In 
November of 2013, the Department of Defense published its Arctic Strategy brief, which 
outlined the US military’s general approach to the Arctic. The Department divides the 
territory between the United States Northern Command and its European Command 
(NORTHCOM and EUCOM, respectively), though NORTHCOM’s commander “is 
responsible for advocating for Arctic capabilities”.170 This designates the Commander of 
NORTHCOM as the military counterpart to the US Special Representative to the Arctic, 
and creates a leadership structure for the region. The brief further states that the 
Department will conduct periodic re-evaluations of Arctic operational requirements for 
all relevant commands, and seek to modify and improve existing infrastructure where 
possible. Regardless of the timeline, the Department will seek to ensure and secure an 
American Arctic presence with any means necessary –surface, submarine, or aerial. 
Notably, however, the brief strays away from defining any specific timelines or objective 
goals for the region, recognizing that projections about the Arctic ice melt may vary 
greatly from year to year, and that fiscal constraints – especially following the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, prevent a full-fledged engagement of the Arctic region. 
Presently, the United States Air Force is the most visible of the United States’ 
Arctic military forces. The Air Force maintains two large bases in Alaska – Eilsen Air 
Force Base and Joint Base Elmendorf. The former, which was reduced in size and scope 
170 United States of America. Department of Defense. Arctic Strategy. 2013. Print. (8) 
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after 2005, supports a fighter wing and an Alaskan Air National Guard refueling wing.171 
Joint Base Elmendorf, by contrast, is home to 12,000 military personnel and the entirety 
of the Eleventh Air Force, comprised of fighter, airlift, and other support capacity. The 
Eleventh Air Force similarly supports a number of radar and early warning installations 
located throughout Alaska as part of NORAD’s extensive radar network.172 The Air 
Force continues to maintain a number of air bases and runway facilities throughout 
Alaska that were drawn down after the Cold War but retain the capacity to support future 
Arctic aviation capability beyond Eilsen and Elmendorf.173 Outside of Alaska, the Air 
Force maintains a sizeable presence at Thule Air Force Base in Greenland. While Thule 
no longer has an active air wing located at the base, it still retains the facilities necessary 
for long-range maritime patrol and bomber aircraft, as well as the world’s northernmost 
deep-water port.174 The Air Force similarly maintains the institutional understanding and 
knowledge necessary for Arctic operations through its support operations for its research 
stations in Greenland.175 
Notably, however, the military in general lacks significant long-range maritime 
patrol capability in the Arctic. A small portion of the military’s HC-130 search and 
rescue aircraft operate from Coast Guard Station Kodiak Island and Elmendorf, in 
addition to a few E-3 early warning radar aircraft from Elmendorf. As such, the US 
military is entirely dependent on ground-based early warning systems leftover in the area 
171 United States of America. Department of Defense. Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the 
Northwest Passage. 2011. Print. 
172 "About NORAD." North American Aerospace Defense Command. Web. 
173 Department of Defense. Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage. 
174 Wezeman, Siemon T. "Military Capabilities in the Arctic." (12) 
175 Department of Defense. Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage. 
55 
                                                                                                 
from the Cold War. Additionally, there are no anti-submarine/surface warfare airframes 
in Alaska or Greenland. 
American naval priorities in the Arctic are defined by the US Navy’s Arctic 
Roadmap 2014-2030, which outlines the Navy’s long-term plans in the Arctic operating 
space. A key portion of the Roadmap is a lengthy study detailing the potential 
navigability of the Arctic Ocean in the decades to come. The report is rather bearish on 
the potential for increased Arctic shipping, noting that it would likely take until 2030 for 
there to be significant open water in all four of the major Arctic shipping routes.176 Even 
then, the routes will only be open for a fraction of the year, with significant amounts of 
shoulder ice even in the summer season. The Navy’s ability to patrol in these straits, 
however, is largely limited by their international legal status. If, as Canada holds in the 
case of the Northwest Passage, and Russia in the case of the Northern Sea Route, these 
straits are internal or territorial waters, then the US Navy would lack the legal right to 
transit or patrol these waters, rendering the discussion of US naval preparedness in the 
area moot. As mentioned previously, this discussion has been the root of diplomatic 
conflict between the United States in Canada previously, though the situation remains 
unresolved. 
American naval capability is limited even within domestic waters. While the 
Navy has standard operating capacity south of the Bering Strait, it loses operational 
capacity in ice-infested waters. None of the US Navy’s surface ships are currently ice-
strengthened, meaning that they will not be able to operate in or north of the Bering Strait 
176 Navy Task Force Climate Change. U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 (11) 
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for half of the year, even in 2030.177 Further, naval capabilities are limited by a lack of 
port facilities in the Arctic region. While Thule AFB maintains a deep-water port, there 
are no similar facilities in the Alaskan Arctic. Currently, there are plans to expand the 
Port of Nome to be able to accommodate larger ships, but neither the Navy nor the Coast 
Guard has announced plans to place a facility there.178 
There is, of course, the much ballyhooed question of the United States’ icebreaker 
fleet, or lack thereof. Currently, the United States Coast Guard only operates three 
icebreakers, the USCGC Polar Sea, Polar Star, and Healy. These icebreakers are 
generally in limited condition. The Polar Star, for instance, was out of commission 
between 2006 and 2012 while waiting for funding for repairs to its engines. Even after 
the repairs were funded in 2010, Admiral Papp (who was Admiral of the Coast Guard at 
that point) was “uncertain” as to the potential future life of the vessel.179 The Polar Sea is 
currently out of service, and is in limbo, as parts were stripped from it to facilitate the 
Polar Star’s refit, and Congress has yet to decide on whether or not to fund repairs or 
decommission the ship entirely. The Healy has only been in service for fifteen years, but 
has lower icebreaking ability than its larger siblings. A fourth icebreaker serves with the 
National Science Foundation, but is only able to support Antarctic research.180  
However, this does not imply that the United States lacks the ability to facilitate 
its current icebreaking needs. Currently, the Polar Star and the Healy are used on 
177 Department of Defense. Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage. (17); 
Navy Task Force Climate Change. U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 
178 "Alaska Deep Draft Arctic Port Study." Alaska Regional Ports. US Army Corps of Engineers. Web. 
179 United States of America. Congressional Research Service. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker 
Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress. By Ronald O'Rourke. 2015. Print. 
180 ibid 
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research patrols and to rescue the occasional abandoned ship in the Arctic or Antarctic.181 
US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is also able to support the annual 
strategic sealift necessary to resupply Thule AFB with its ice-class general cargo ship and 
its ice-class tanker.182 Further, given the scarce population in Northern Alaska, there is no 
civilian need for icebreakers to resupply Arctic Alaskan communities. These 
communities are instead served by regularly scheduled air service and access facilitated 
by the Pan-American Highway. By contrast, rural communities in Russia are spread out 
and lack airport facilities, necessitating resupply by sea.183 
A bright spot for US naval capabilities in the Arctic continues to be the operation 
capabilities of its nuclear submarine fleet. The Navy conducts regular submarines patrols 
under the Arctic, frequently surfacing through thick ice at the North Pole.184 The Navy 
similarly has eleven SSBNs stationed at Naval Base Kitsap in Washington State, giving 
the Navy’s nuclear submarine fleet quick and easy access to the Arctic operating 
environment. Given the nature of submarines, they are not limited by weather conditions, 
and can operate under the ice year-round.185 To further the capabilities of American 
submarines operating underneath the Arctic surface, the Navy operates an Arctic 
Submarine Laboratory in San Diego, California.186 Additionally, US Naval forces 
181 United States Coast Guard. 11th District Pacific Southwest. US Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star to Assist 
Vessels in Antarctica. News Releases. United States Coast Guard, 4 Jan. 2014. Web. 
182 Department of Defense. Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage. 
183 Østreng, Willy. Shipping in Arctic Waters: A Comparison of the Northeast, Northwest and Trans Polar 
Passages. Heidelberg: Springer, 2013. Print. 
184 Wezeman, Siemon T. "Military Capabilities in the Arctic." (13) 
185 "Environment: Operations." All About Sea Ice. National Snow & Ice Data Center. Web. 
186 Department of Defense. Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage. 
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conduct a semi-annual Ice Exercise (ICEX) in the Arctic to test submarine operations and 
tactics in conjunction with surface warfare requirements.187  
Whatever further steps are taken to bolster US military efforts in the Arctic will 
be complemented by a wealth of internal planning and military simulations. The 
aforementioned military shortcomings became readily apparent after the US Naval War 
College conducted the Fleet Operations Arctic Game in 2011 to simulate responses to a 
number of different potential scenarios in an Arctic becoming more widely trafficked.188 
Further, the US military plans and executes a number of war simulations and field 
training exercises in the Alaskan Arctic environment annually, including the semiannual 
RED FLAG-Alaska, and the annual Northern Edge exercise.189 Northern Edge in 
particular is a joint training exercise, allowing the Navy and the Air Force to gain 
valuable institutional knowledge about Arctic operations. 
Key Findings 
Based on the previous findings and information, the following observations about the 
Arctic can be made: 
1. The United States lacks a concerted policy direction and goals for its role in the 
Arctic 
Each of the other major Arctic nations has a detailed public policy document 
outlining their general goals and visions for the Arctic operating space. These documents 
include everything from military strategies, affirmations of certain national beliefs, and a 
187 ibid 
188 United States of America. United States Navy. United States Naval War College. Fleet Arctic 
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vision for the nations’ roles in the Arctic moving forward. The United States lacks such a 
document, and the close approximations that it does have – NSPD 66 and the National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region – have led to a holding pattern for US Arctic policy. 
Specific stakeholders within the United States are developing their own discrete Arctic 
policies, as evidenced by the Arctic policies of the State Department, Department of 
Defense, and the US Navy. However, a lack of top-level policy direction – created by 
either Congress or the Executive Branch – is hindering any US progress on the Arctic 
issue. Key policy holes identified by each of the aforementioned stakeholders cannot be 
filled without the approval or buy-in of either Congress or the Executive, and as such, 
these branches cannot act on the shortcomings that they discover. 
2. The United States is at an international legal disadvantage in regards to securing 
its Arctic claims as a result of it not acceding to the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 
Functionally, the United States abides by the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. However, even though it has signed the document, the fact that it has not acceded to 
the Convention means that the United Nations will not protect American maritime 
interests – especially in the Arctic. Even though the United States considers a large swath 
of the Arctic as its own territory, this claim cannot and will not be defended by 
international law given the United States’ non-participation in UNCLOS. As such, the 
United States faces a situation in which the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf makes decisions on Arctic maritime boundaries that do not consider American 
interests. Considering that the Convention has been amended to consider, and be 
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favorable to, American interests, it is foolhardy for the United States to continue to be the 
only Arctic nation that is not a party to the Convention. 
3. The United States Navy is at a severe relative operating deficiency in the Arctic 
due to top-level dithering on Arctic issues 
Currently, American operational influence in the region is limited by a total lack 
of naval resources. The Navy can only patrol north of the Bering Strait when it is free of 
ice, and lacks the ability to conduct long-range maritime patrols over the territory that it 
is tasked with defending. While SSBNs and attack submarines maintain a powerful and 
convincing dominance under the Arctic seas, above, American naval power is nowhere to 
be found. In the event of an oil spill, humanitarian disaster, or foreign incursion, 
American military power will be either incumbent on its aging and decrepit trio of 
icebreakers or on foreign aid. While Canada, the United States’ closest ally is preparing 
its own military in a way that will allow it to defend its own Arctic holdings, continued 
and protracted diplomatic irritations over the Northwest Passage and Beaufort Wedge 
prevent the guarantee that Canada will be as supportive of the United States in the Arctic 
as it is elsewhere. Though the Navy is well aware of their operating limits within the 
Arctic and the steps necessary to fix the problem, Congressional and Executive inaction 
means that these solutions cannot be pursued. 
4. Alarm over foreign Arctic military buildups – especially that of Russia – is 
misplaced 
While each of the other Arctic nations is investing large amounts of capital into 
their Arctic operational capacities, each comes with a large set of footnotes that reduces 
the magnitude of their threat to the United States. In each case, a much vaunted Arctic 
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militarization equates simply to a protection of economic interests and strategic defense. 
While Russia is indeed leading the pack in terms of its Arctic military buildup, and 
engaging in particularly bellicose rhetoric regarding the region, the actual threat is rather 
benign. Russia (for once) is following international law in the region. It has limited its 
Arctic buildup to undisputedly Russian territories, and the majority of its military buildup 
is oriented at protecting its oil and gas interests and securing the Northern Sea Route as a 
viable maritime shipping route. While its actions in the region may seem more 
provocative to a US audience – especially in the context of its more overarching foreign 
policy and other international actions – its Arctic policy is based on protecting the 
interests afforded to it by its accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
5. The “Icebreaker Gap” is not as severe as it is made out to be 
It is irrefutable that the United States possesses one of the worst-equipped 
icebreaker fleets of the major Arctic powers. It is sorely in need of supplementation – 
something that the United States Coast Guard and other public figures have called for 
repeatedly in the past. However, the American lack of icebreakers is not as severe a 
situation as it may appear. The United States still manages to conduct the work necessary 
to its present Arctic position with its current fleet of icebreakers. While the increased 
workload caused by potential offshore Alaskan drilling and increased maritime traffic 
through the Bering Strait will necessitate additional icebreaking capacity, the total 
absence of both at present means that current American capacity is not as deficient as it is 
made out to be. Even as shipping and resource exploitation increases, the United States 
has far less need for icebreaking, given that Northern Alaska is unlikely to become an 
urban area anytime soon. 
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A New Arctic Strategy: Cautious Icebreaking 
The United States must develop an Arctic Strategy that takes into consideration its 
domestic military shortcomings in conjunction with its international aims. If the United 
States is to be acknowledged in the Arctic space as the global power that it is elsewhere, 
then it must join the rest of the Arctic nations on the same international legal level. 
However, given the uncertainty and timeline of the Arctic’s future, the United States 
needn’t approach a new Arctic policy with a sense of existential dread, but rather 
cautious path finding. The Arctic ice, as an example, is irrefutably receding every year. 
However, the pace of this disappearance varies annually, and follows an unpredictably 
declining trend with a long time frame. As such, the United States is afforded the luxury 
of time in approaching its Arctic deficiencies. 
The timeline calls for a slow approach to Arctic policy that solves current 
problems without tying the United States to a specific agenda or ideology in the region. 
First and foremost, a new Arctic policy should facilitate the US Coast Guard and Navy’s 
desired expansion of their Arctic capabilities. This needn’t be a major affair, but rather 
provide enough support to meet current needs, and lay the framework to accommodate 
future growth at whatever pace it may come. Any new Arctic Policy must also follow and 
acknowledge the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that the rest of the world’s Arctic 
powers follow. While the United States enjoys the power of supremacy in the rest of the 
world, it is too late to the Arctic to direct events in its own exclusive interests. Instead, 
the policy must acknowledge the fact that other parties are at the table, and accommodate 
the pre-existing policies that have been created by UNCLOS. Finally, the policy should 
avoid making provocative statements against other Arctic powers – specifically Russia – 
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and focus instead on areas for international collaboration. While US policy in general 
may be based on countering Russia, poking the bear has the potential to accelerate 
Russia’s military buildup in the Arctic past protection into aggression. The Arctic is one 
of the few areas in the world where traditionally opposed powers have the ability to 
cooperate. Thus far, the Arctic Council has proven an excellent example of this, as its 
members engage in a number of confidence-building measures ranging from Search and 
Rescue arrangements to cultural exchanges. A new American Arctic policy should 
acknowledge this status quo – which American officials have been participating in for 
many years as well – and seek to encourage, rather than destroy it.  
Specific Policy Recommendations 
Based on the above findings and strategic suggestions, the United States should: 
1. Create an “American Arctic Policy” document at the Executive level  
While the National Arctic Strategy is a start, the President should take steps to 
create specific policy goals and aims that not only bolster current international standards 
but also apply them to domestic Arctic spaces as well. This document should follow the 
pattern of other nations’ Arctic policy documents in outlining the specific ties of the 
United States to the region, and the actions that it will take to protect the area. Such a 
document will not only signal to the rest of the world’s Arctic powers that the United 
States is now taking the Arctic seriously, but also telegraph an American commitment to 
the existing international legal system 
2. Accede to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The President and interested parties should seek to assuage outdated 
Congressional concerns over diminished sovereignty and resource protection in the 
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Arctic and elsewhere by pointing to the numerous benefits afforded to the United States 
by the Convention. The United State cannot stand alone in the Arctic without accession 
to the document, lest forthcoming international legal decisions ignore or invalidate 
American claims and potential in the region.  
3. Approve or facilitate funding for a new heavy icebreaker, while solving the 
question of the Polar Sea 
The United States Congress should either approve of the US Coast Guard’s 
request for increased funding for a new heavy icebreaker, or increase the Coast Guard’s 
budget in a way that would allow it to facilitate the addition of another icebreaker to 
active service. At present, the Polar Sea remains laid up due to a lack of a Congressional 
mandate on the matter. Either the Polar Sea should be deactivated and decommissioned, 
or funds should be allocated to its repair. In the event of the former, Congress should 
appropriate funds to the Coast Guard necessary to facilitate the construction of a new 
heavy icebreaker to replace the loss in icebreaking capacity represented by the 
incapacitation of the Polar Sea. This will also aid in potential American exploration of 
natural resource exploitation in traditionally unreachable Arctic zones. 
4. Adjudicate an appropriate compromise on the Beaufort Wedge dispute with 
Canada  
The United States loses out on massive potential revenues from fishing and 
commercial resource extraction in the region by not coming to an agreement with Canada 
on the matter of the wedge’s ownership. The two nations’ continued dispute over the 
matter has resulted in a lose-lose scenario, wherein neither is able to reap the massive 
economic benefits that lay beneath the waves. Even if the United States were to split the 
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region in half with Canada, it would still gain from being able to harvest half the region’s 
resources, as opposed to the present lack of resource extraction in the area. Most 
importantly, however, the United States would solve a lasting diplomatic issue with its 
closest regional and global ally, building confidence and mutual trust. 
5. Improve bilateral capabilities and create agreements with Russia in the Bering 
Strait and Canada in the Beaufort Sea 
While the Northern Sea Route is a Russian-oriented maritime shipping route, any 
vessel transiting through the route will eventually pass through the Bering Strait, which is 
a strait that both Russia and the United States have jurisdiction over. Similarly, both 
Canada and the United States have jurisdiction over portions of the Beaufort Sea. As 
such, if a disaster such as a sinking ship or oil spill were to occur, the United States 
would have to respond in tandem with either Russia or Canada. Creating bilateral search 
and rescue agreements in both bodies of water and beginning joint training and 
information sharing would not only improve relations between either nations, but also 
ensure an appropriate and swift response to potentially harmful situations. 
6. Strengthen international cooperation through strong Arctic Council leadership 
The United States’ chairmanship of the Arctic Council during the time in which 
the Arctic is coming to the forefront of Arctic nations’ policies allows the United States a 
fast track to leadership in an issue where it has traditionally lagged behind. The United 
States, therefore, has the ability to use its chairmanship of the Council to advocate a 
particular agenda or goal that will help its case for being acknowledged as a leader in the 
Arctic space. This will also have the joint benefit of creating the basis for further 
international cooperation in the region. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
The United States has not “lost” the Arctic, and no other major Arctic nation has 
“won” the Arctic. However, the United States certainly is losing the Arctic by failing to 
play at the same level as the rest of the world’s Arctic nations. By refusing to accede to 
UNCLOS, modernize its fleet of icebreakers and naval equipment, and facilitate 
compromises with its closest allies, the United States risks being left behind in the race to 
capitalize on the vast resources of the Arctic. Fortunately for the United States, each of 
the other Arctic nations has not been able to take a decisive lead in the region, with each 
suffering military, economic, or other domestic policy obstacles to regional leadership. 
These nations – even those that traditionally do not – are generally cooperating under 
various international frameworks, something which makes the Arctic unique amongst the 
regions of the world. Ultimately, the United States has the ability to rise to its traditional 
leadership role in the Arctic region as it melts if it adopts a certain few policy 
recommendations. However, if the United States fails to heed the Arctic’s growing 
importance and implement these suggestions, it risks being frozen in the Arctic’s past 
forever. 
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